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Afterword 
 
Thinking with outrageous propositions  
 
Monica Greco 
 
‘It is always better to produce an interesting disease than a mediocre painting’ (1988: 
540): with this proposition, as with so many others from the lectures he delivered to 
patients at his Marienhöhe clinic in Baden-Baden between 1916 and 1919, Georg 
Groddeck rejoiced in provocation. In 1918 he had no qualms in naming the 
sanatorium’s new house magazine Satanarium, in explicit homage to Hell as the only 
place where, it seemed to him, a man could scream his agony ‘unimpeded, without 
shame or reserve’ (1992: 15). Nor should we imagine that in invoking Hell he had in 
mind the metaphorical ‘hell’ of WWI – which some of his patients would have 
experienced first-hand – rather than a more literal Hell with the full complement of 
damning moral connotations. The hellish agonies that the Satanarium was to vent 
were first and foremost those of ordinary patients, whom Groddeck encouraged to 
experiment with regarding their illness as expiation for their criminal desires.  They, 
the patients, might disagree with this or other similar pronouncements. But they must 
make an effort not to disagree. As he put it,  
 
You must make an effort to believe, you must silence all doubts in yourselves. It 
makes no sense to refute what I say through reasonable arguments. It is easy to 
find this or that false, but that is not the point of the exercise. You have come 
here to be helped. What I deliver is a remedy, a medication. (1987: 95)  
 
In his medical version of a re-evaluation of all values, Groddeck thus staged a joyous 
obliviousness to the modern settlement, the one whereby disease and illness have 
become equally divorced from questions of aesthetic appreciation as from the 
metaphysics of evil and sin. His provocations playfully unhinged and reshuffled the 
customary relations between these conceptual frames, and in so doing they worked 
their healing magic. By all accounts, he was much loved and highly sought-after as a 
doctor, known for his ‘astonishing success with patients suffering from chronic 
symptoms long since abandoned as non-curable by others’ (M.C., 1951: 6).  
 
The essays in this volume have addressed, in different ways, the question of how we 
might cultivate a speculative sensibility in our engagements with the empirical, and 
thereby also foster ‘deep empiricism’ (Stenner, 2008) in cultural and social research. 
Following Stengers, this sensibility has been described as defined by a concern with 
‘resisting a future that presents itself as probable or plausible’, through practices 
designed to actively explore the ‘unrealised potential of the present’ and to summon 
latent (im)possibilities in the becoming of the world (Savransky, Wilkie and 
Rosengarten, this volume). In this concluding contribution I propose to think both 
with and through the ‘maverick’ Georg Groddeck in order to address a double 
challenge involved in this speculative task. This is, on the one hand, the challenge of 
taking the (im)possible seriously. Often, this will entail developing a mode of paying 
attention that might allow us to feel the latent (im)possibilities in propositions, in 
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modes or life and practice, that have ‘fared badly, thrown into the dustheap, 
neglected’ (Whitehead, 1978: 259). To the extent that such propositions have already 
been dismissed, surpassed, or denounced – whether retrospectively or preemptively – 
the speculative venture will thus demand that we associate with entities that may be 
epistemically weak and, for that reason, marginal. There is therefore an element of 
thinking ‘against the grain’ involved in a speculative ethos of research: not in the 
sense of thinking polemically or oppositionally, but in the sense of thinking against 
the inertia of thought, resisting the mental habits that unconsciously structure our 
judgment and channel our interest, which may include habits of reasonableness and 
criticism. In this process of thinking against the grain we strive to ignore the multiple 
sedimented strata of all that might tempt us, in turn, to be dismissive in the interest of 
caution – whether to preserve a sense of our own plausibility, safeguard a reputation, 
or build a career. We might then find ourselves in the penumbrae of liminal 
disciplinary locations, or drawn to the quagmires of ‘liminal hotspots’ (Greco and 
Stenner, 2016) – the wicked problems that can accrue from the solutions to 
mainstream ones, chronic symptoms of a way of life that have long-since been 
abandoned as incurable (or inevitable) by others. In reaching towards the improbable 
to activate new possibilities, the propositions we entertain may thus involve a degree 
of inconvenience and may well appear objectionable, if taken at face value, on a 
variety of immediately reasonable grounds. If we do take this risk, it is in order to 
allow ourselves to stay with the improbable and the inconvenient, to prolong it into 
far-reaching implications that could only obtain in conjunction with the imagination 
of a different world, so as to summon the possibility of such a world.   
 
If this, on the one hand, is the challenge involved in speculative research, taking the 
risk of such an adventure, on the other hand, cannot mean throwing all caution to the 
wind. A different set of risks concerns the probability that this adventure may itself 
fare badly in a variety of ways, such that, as we craft propositions to summon the 
(im)possible, we must also strive to take care of the possible (Stengers, 2010). There 
are many aspects to this challenge but here – and with reference to the practice of 
cultural and social research – I want to attend specifically to the aspect that relates to 
thinking with ‘outrageous’ propositions. Propositions that may have been tolerable by 
virtue of being neglected can acquire an outrageous character when we propose to 
take them seriously. And the challenge associated with this outrageous character 
concerns the extent to which it may hinder the proposition from becoming interesting, 
and thus detract from its capacity to lure, to bridge the way into novelty.  
 
Indeed let me suggest that the speculative adventure may have about it something 
inherently outrageous: this word gifts us with an ambivalence that leads to the heart 
of the double challenge I have sought to describe so far. From the Latin ultra, in terms 
of its pure etymology it refers to ‘what goes beyond’, in any sense. Current meanings 
listed in the Oxford English Dictionary include ‘wildly improbable’ as well as ‘very 
bold and unusual’. But historical usage also links outrageous explicitly to acts of 
violent excess, injury and affront, meanings further consolidated in the English 
language by the folk etymology of out + rage.  An outrageous proposition, in this 
sense, would be one that provokes the outpour of extreme anger, indignation and 
shock, with the probable effect of entrenching existing lines of difference and 
polemical contradiction, rather than opening them to new possibilities of relation. 
These meanings convey the sense in which, as we seek to articulate ‘what goes 
beyond’ the pivotal actualities of the present, as we seek to unhinge and reshuffle the 
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registers through which we make sense of experience, there is a genuine potential for 
this operation to become destructive, and we should be mindful of this potential. One 
aspect of this problem is linked to what authors working on the dynamics of transition 
in political anthropology have addressed through the concept of the ‘trickster’, a 
marginal figure able to exploit the uncertainty and indeterminacy of liminal situations 
to ‘institute a lasting reversal of roles and values’ with the sole aim, however, of 
placing themselves at the centre and maximising their own power (Szakolczai, 2009: 
155; see also Horvath, 1998, 2007; Horvath and Thomassen, 2008). In a different 
context, and in relation to the efficacy of her own interpretations, Isabelle Stengers 
has addressed this negative potential through what she calls the ‘Leibnizian 
constraint’: the idea that the statement of what one believes to be true should ‘bear the 
responsibility not to hinder becoming: not to collide with established sentiments, so as 
to try to open them to what their established identity led them to refuse, combat, 
misunderstand’ (2000: 15). In both cases we are warned about the dangers of 
following outrageous propositions – propositions whose lure is to offer a springboard 
for the imagination of different possible futures – at the expense of a commonsense, in 
what might become an unwitting pursuit of ‘ignoble curiosities of the understanding’ 
(Whitehead, 1962: 154). 
 
The relevance of Groddeck to this problematic, as a case to think with, is multi-
layered. On one level, we may describe his own practice as an instance of speculative 
experimentation with (im)possibilities, mobilising an array of lures for feeling, like 
other practices of healing have done since time immemorial and indeed continue to 
do. What appears distinctive about his practice, at least among those operating in the 
horizon of the modern settlement, is that from an initial position of established 
authority – he trained and later collaborated with Ernst Schweninger, the private 
physician of Otto von Bismarck, and members of the Emperor’s family were among 
his own patients – Groddeck put outrageous propositions into play as such, that is, he 
took deliberate care to maintain their speculative character. Groddeck not only did not 
attempt to systematise and stabilise his lures into theoretical claims, but actively 
resisted doing so, in the same way as he actively refused to qualify himself as a 
scientist, at a time and in a context that would have been particularly conducive to 
him doing precisely that. Instead, he introduced himself as a ‘wild analyst’ before the 
Psychoanalytic Association at the Hague in 1920, prompting remarks that he had, in 
this and other ways, ‘endangered the carefully earned esteem of psychoanalysts with 
his carefree behaviour’ (Storfer, in Tytell, 1980: 93). In The Ego and the Id, where 
Freud credited Groddeck for inspiring him to use the term Id (the Latin equivalent of 
the German Es, which was Groddeck’s preferred form), Freud attributed Groddeck’s 
self-distancing from the ‘rigours of pure science’ to personal motives, and described it 
as a form of vanity (1984: 362). While there may be some truth in this 
characterisation, it fails to capture the sense in which Groddeck’s gesture of refusal 
expressed a form of coherence with the obligations inherent in his practice first and 
foremost as a healer. While Freud was busy developing concepts – such as 
countertransference – designed to safeguard the objectivity of his method, Groddeck 
happily conceded that ‘[a] certain harmony of feeling on the animal level between 
doctor and patient is the fundamental basis of medical treatment, which is, in essence 
a reciprocal activity’, adding that  
 
[t]he term ‘animal’ is meant to indicate that this important factor in treatment 
has, to begin with, nothing to do with the knowledge and skill of the physician, 
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but arises from the contact of two human worlds and from their mutual human 
sympathy and antipathy. (Groddeck, 1949: 46, my emphases). 
 
This, for Groddeck, was the basis for insisting on the importance of physical contact 
in healing, and of massage as a form of psychotherapy in the treatment of organic 
disease. Both ‘psychotherapy’ and ‘organic disease’ are here to be taken literally (he 
wrote of them as such) and yet, to some extent, they are misnomers, in so far as he 
also never tired of pointing out their character as abstractions from the Es, the 
‘Universal Whole’ that merely expresses itself in everything we are and do, including 
our concepts (1951: 72 and ff.). The possibility of healing, then, did not depend for 
Groddeck on the application of an objectively ‘true’ theory, a theory whose truth 
would be predicated on an operation of separation and distinction of the subject of 
knowledge from its object. It depended exactly on the opposite, that is, on the 
recognition of a fundamental continuity (not separation) that obtains between human 
beings and indeed the whole world at the level of experience, such that they can come 
to ‘resonate’ in sympathy, and thus act as lures for each other.1 We might regard this 
fundamental continuity in experience – between doctor and patient, in this case – as 
the foundation of a commonsense, a shared form of thought and discourse that would 
reflect the multiplicity and indeterminacy, and thus the hesitations and the speculative 
tendency, that arise from the ‘radically untidy’ character of actual experience itself 
(Whitehead, 1962: 157). We can see therefore that, while being biomedically trained, 
Groddeck had very good reasons for refusing to subject his propositions as a 
physician to the ‘rigours of pure science’ in so far as doing so would precisely have 
produced rigidity, compromising their capacity to communicate at the level of this 
commonsense in the most responsive and suggestive way possible. 
 
In his practice, then, Groddeck put outrageous propositions into play, explicitly 
subordinating their truth-value to the value of their interest, of their capacity to effect 
a change of perspective in those whom he lured into resonating with them. He did this 
by making a home for such propositions at Marienhöhe, a medical clinic, where they 
formed, as he put it, part of his treatment.  Alongside physical therapy mainly based 
on massage and diet, this treatment routinely included asking patients questions about 
the intention and purpose of their illness, regardless of the type of condition they 
suffered from, be it a broken limb, heart disease, or a tumour: 
 
it is my custom to ask a patient who has slipped and broken his arm: ‘What was 
your idea in breaking your arm?’ whereas if anyone is reported to have had 
recourse to morphia to get to sleep the night before, I ask him, ‘How was it that 
the idea of morphine became so important yesterday that you had to make 
yourself sleepless in order to have an excuse for taking it?’ So far I have never 
failed to get a useful reply to such questions and there is nothing extraordinary 
about that, for if we take the trouble to make the search we can always find both 
an inward and an outward cause for any event in life. In medicine the external 
cause has received so much attention – it is in some ways, of course, much the 
simpler to deal with or at least to name – that there can be no great harm if a 
few doctors here and there seem to exaggerate the importance of the neglected 
inward cause, and maintain as I do that man creates his own illnesses for 
definite purposes … (1951: 81) 
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We are prompted to wonder about the system of relations that made the efficacy of 
this question – about the purpose illness served, and what a patient might want to 
obtain through their illness – so very different in the context of Marienhöhe from 
virtually any other context since then.  It is significant, for example, that the question 
was asked as part of the treatment, and not as a condition of admittance into 
treatment. A hundred years later, however, we are so far from being able to feel the 
proposition expressed in Groddeck’s question, that it seems superfluous to dwell on 
the details of such relations. Instead, we hear it muffled by the historicisation of the 
figure of Groddeck, through which any lure or challenge it might pose becomes 
qualified and tamed by the fact that, as we know, he was a maverick. His propositions 
might be excused and indulged, in the same movement by which we might be excused 
for not taking them seriously.  
 
What might it mean, then, and moving now to a different plane of analysis, to take the 
(im)possibilities latent in Groddeck’s propositions seriously, today? I have chosen this 
example because, as well as expressing so well the features of a speculative ethos and 
the risks it entails, it also resonates strongly and directly with a number of polemics 
that define the political context of contemporary healthcare, particularly in relation to 
the growing number of so-called contested illnesses and ‘medically unexplained 
symptoms’ (Greco, 2012). As a category of illness these are epistemically marginal 
and yet empirically prevalent; for the purpose of challenging our habits of thought 
they represent, I contend, an exemplary case of much broader relevance. It is in this 
context that Groddeck’s propositions, if we take them seriously and at face value, 
sound distinctly outrageous in the negative sense of this term. They sound 
outrageous, that is, not in the sense that they might provoke curiosity and perhaps 
amusement, stimulating an effort of comprehension, a personal ‘flight after the 
unattainable’ (Whitehead, 1958: 65) that might effect a new perspective. They sound 
outrageous, rather, in the sense that they are likely to provoke outrage and polemical 
entrenchment – the familiar ‘How dare you suggest that I have brought this on 
myself, that it is my fault! How dare you suggest that my illness is all in the mind, 
that it isn’t real!’.  Groddeck himself – in his lectures, delivered in the last two years 
of WWI – pointed to the conditions under which the type of questions he routinely 
asked of his patients would soon become outrageous in this way. He claimed that the 
medical profession had been irrevocably compromised by the Great War, in so far as 
doctors had been called upon to perform functions of policing (1988, 515). From then 
on, asking a patient ‘What do you want to obtain with your illness?’ would be 
associated with questioning the authenticity of the illness, and implicitly accusing the 
person of lying. For Groddeck, this had been a question to be asked of every patient 
and every type of illness. By contrast, within the modern settlement that strictly 
bifurcates ‘external causes’ from ‘internal’ ones (to use Groddeck’s terminology), 
questions about the intentionality of illness, coupled with the attribution of a forensic 
function to any objective evidence of disease, are only asked as part of a process of 
differentiating between more or less authentic, more or less legitimate ‘illnesses’. The 
potential interest of the question in relation to the possibility of effecting a change of 
perspective becomes unintelligible, pre-empted by the possibility of judgment, 
disqualification, and exclusion, while the question as such becomes something to be 
actively avoided and resisted at all cost.  
 
Notwithstanding the specific local genealogies of this predicament, it is one that now 
obtains generally, and ever more so, in so far as medicine is moving increasingly in 
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the direction that Groddeck resisted.  Rheumatologist Nortin Hadler (1996) captured 
the essence of this situation when he described it as a iatrogenic vortex whereby if you 
have to prove you are ill, you can’t get well. Research by sociologists and 
anthropologists has amply illustrated how people with contested illnesses or 
‘unexplained symptoms’, in their struggle to obtain legitimacy and to become a 
credible patient in the absence of a biomarker for their condition, become caught in a 
pragmatic paradox. On the one hand they will adopt rigidly biomedical idioms of 
explanation in their interactions with medical gatekeepers, ‘resonating’ with the 
constraints of those settings, as well as in wider public forums (although, importantly, 
they might use other, richer idioms elsewhere, as in conversations with family or 
friends).  At the same time, these strategies will tend to make them conspicuous in a 
psycho-behavioural rather than biomedical sense, as deliberately ‘performing’ – and 
therefore faking – their illness.2 Conversely, in the presence of a biomedically 
recognised disease, as in the ‘lifestyle diseases’ that are now leading causes of death 
worldwide, the biomarker acts de facto as a guarantor of ‘external’ causality – the 
necessary and sufficient condition for access to the system, at least ideally – such that 
it appears superfluous and inappropriate to ask questions about intentionality and 
purpose in any therapeutically competent sense.  This does not mean, however, that 
such questions are not asked in relation to these diseases, on the contrary: they 
proliferate in non-medical, political and public discourse, in the context of angry 
polemics where they are typically mobilised to apportion blame to (categories of) 
individuals. In both cases, we can fully appreciate how the proposition that ‘man 
creates his own illnesses for definite purposes’ might be one that anyone who is wary 
of stigmatising the sick, or blaming the victim, would want to steer clear of – hence 
the tendency for social scientists to align with mobilised patients in denouncing the 
outrageousness of anything that might suggest it. In simply rejecting the proposition 
as outrageous, however, they collude in reinforcing the bifurcated logic that renders it 
so, and they allow it to proliferate in conditions of enunciation that are not conducive 
to exploring it or qualifying in any constructive sense. 
 
Groddeck’s questions to his patients were challenging and outrageous already in his 
own time, but primarily from the perspective of a commonsense already informed by 
a bifurcated understanding of nature, which has consolidated more widely since then. 
It is only in the context of this bifurcation that an illness that is real in a biophysical 
sense must, in essence, be considered devoid of any spiritual, existential, moral or 
aesthetic value, and that any illusion to the contrary pertains to a subjective judgment 
that has no place in orienting a medical practice that claims its authority on the basis 
of scientific facts. We can now appreciate how, in the context of Marienhöhe, 
Groddeck did not so much shock his patients as surprise them, by authorising them – 
in the space he protected from the ‘rigours of pure science’ – to follow his lead in 
exploring and trusting a more primordial, ‘animal’ commonsense.  This commonsense 
might be described as the sense that would experience illness as a totality of relations 
involving every other aspect of life, a sense made not of clear demarcations but of 
hesitant intuitions and wonderings about all these relations. Groddeck’s 
outrageousness was to propose that such commonsense should be at the core of a 
therapeutic venture, rather than being admitted at best as an afterthought or an 
accessory. In pursuing this aim, Groddeck maintained, it was specifically important to 
avoid fostering ‘[t]he absurd superstitions about medical matters which one finds in 
all social classes, [and which] have become in their half-knowledge a general danger’ 
(1949: 49). He also made it clear that such ‘superstitions’ typically had their origin in 
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‘the mistakes of the expert’ – among which he counted medical diagnostic practices – 
adding that such mistakes ‘continue long after they have been recognised as such by 
experts; they are tough, inert masses and difficult to get rid off [sic]’ (1977: 242). 
 
Moving now towards a conclusion, what can we learn from thinking with Groddeck 
about the value and risks, more generally, of engaging with outrageous propositions 
in speculative research? The possibility of taking Groddeck seriously depends, as 
Foucault taught us (1969), on removing the filters that would prevent us from relating 
to his propositions as equal to our own, that is, as deserving of the same serious 
consideration. In Groddeck’s case, this is the filter of historicisation that would have 
us regard and ‘forgive’ him as a maverick. Other filters are possible in relation to 
other propositions that similarly ‘go beyond’ what our habits of thought would allow 
us to take seriously. Once we remove such filters, the world appears full of 
outrageous propositions pointing to wondrous possibilities. One conclusion to be 
drawn here, therefore, concerns simply the importance of learning to recognise 
outrageous propositions that are good for the purpose of thinking with them, in 
relation to our problems.   
 
Groddeck’s propositions draw our attention precisely because, taken at face value, 
they are simultaneously so similar and yet so different from propositions that are 
ubiquitous, and that tend to cause outrage, today. We have learned to distrust the 
contemporary propositions, for good reasons; but Groddeck offers the opportunity of 
reading similar statements in the context of an entirely different system of relations, 
where they point to a completely different set of conclusions and surprising 
consequences. Taking the (im)possibilities latent in his propositions seriously thus 
means appreciating this contrast, which produces a hesitation where previously there 
might have been a knee-jerk reaction of dismissal. My particular example has 
illustrated how social scientists can often be outraged by proxy, and dismiss 
outrageous propositions in the name of siding with the underdog, against power; but 
in such hasty dismissals, as we have seen, they can reinforce the system of relations 
that has rendered a proposition offensive and injurious in the first place. Learning to 
hesitate would then mean that we gain a deeper insight into the contextual, situated 
impulse behind the need for such a dismissal; that we become aware of some of its 
potential unintended consequences; and that we become capable of entertaining the 
thought that, in a different system of relations, a given proposition might become 
interesting rather than offensive. 
 
What we also learn from this example is that, while it is useful to think with 
outrageous propositions in order to reactivate latent (im)possibilities, we must take 
very great care in how we re-propose them. In this respect Groddeck is interesting 
specifically because of the explicit care he took in relation to the efficacy of his 
thought. He situated his statements in such a way that they could ‘go beyond’ and 
thus provoke surprise, but not outrage. While it is impossible to turn his strategy into 
a general prescription, it points to the importance, once again, of evaluating what 
doing this might mean in the context of relations within which we hope to intervene. 
 
 
Endnotes
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1 Groddeck’s language in describing experience comes remarkably close that of Whitehead and 
William James. Indeed, when read alongside their work it ceases to seem so outlandish and becomes an 
exemplary instance of what Stenner (2011) calls their ‘deep empiricism’. Consider for example this 
statement, from an essay entitled The Part as Whole: ‘I assume … that the assertion “I live” only 
expresses a small and superficial part of the total experience, “I am lived by the It”. Every human 
happening depends on the It, yet no human thought or invention can ever lead us to the heart of its 
mystery, since none of us however learned, wise, lucky, or imaginative, can ever hope to jump out of 
his skin and view man’s nature as a whole. At the same time, it is possible by close and careful 
observation of human behaviour – our own and other people’s – to discover something about the It’s 
modes of expression.’ (1951: 73).  
2 See e.g. Dumit 2003 and 2006; Werner and Malterud, 2003; Bech-Risør, 2009; Barker, 2011. See 
Greco and Stenner (2016) for a discussion of this iatrogenic vortex as an illustration in the broader 
context of a theorisation of the dynamics of  ‘liminal hotspots’. 
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